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Conscience and Civil Disobedience in
Jewish, Christian, and Greek and
Roman Thought
By MILTON R. KONVITZ*
. HE FIRST CHAPTER OF EXODUS relates that the ruler of
Egypt, alarmed by the increase in the number of Israelites,
Zspoke to the Hebrew midwives and directed them to kill all
male iifants born to Hebrew women. "But the midwives feared God
and did not as the king of Egypt commanded them, but saved the
menchildren alive."' Thereupon the king issued a new decree, di-
rected not to the midwives but to the people generally, ordering them
to kill all newborn Hebrew males by throwing them into the River
Nile.2
These events, which happened some 3,400 years ago, may well
have been the first recorded instance of what is today called nonvio-
lent civil disobedience. From the biblical text it is not clear that
the midwives were themselves Hebrews. They acted as they did,
not because they were Hebrews but because they "feared God." The
text twice mentions the fact that they "feared God" or, as we would
say today, that they listened to the voice of conscience rather than
to the law of the state or the voice of the king.
In the first book of Samuel there is another clear and dramatic
example of nonviolent civil disobedience. There it is related that
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1. Exodus 1:15-17 (all Biblical references are to the King James version unless
otherwise noted).
2. Exodus 1:22.
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when King Saul learned that a certain priest had given David food
and other assistance, he ordered the priest to appear before him.
And the king said to the guards who stood about him, "Turn and
kill the priests of the Lord; because their hand also is with David,
and they knew that he fled, and did not disclose it to me." But
the servants of the king would not put forth their hand to fall
upon the priests of the Lord.3
This refusal to follow the king's orders may have been the first re-
corded instance of nonviolent civil disobedience by military men. It
is not clear why the men of the guard refused to kill the priests and
their families. It may have been because the victims belonged to
the priestly class or because they were civilians. Whatever the rea-
son, their action was a clear case of civil disobedience.
In the book of Daniel we find what may be the first recorded
instances of what became a pattern of Jewish life and history, willing
submission to martyrdom for the sake of one's religion. Chapter 3
records that King Nebuchadnezzar erected a huge image of gold and
summoned all the high officials of the realm to attend the dedication.
He ordered that they prostrate themselves and worship the image when
they heard the sound of music, and that whoever disobeyed this
command be thrown into a blazing furnace. It was later reported to
the king that Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego, three Jews who were
high provincial administrators, had failed to worship the golden image.
When charged by the King with this offense, they said to him:
We have no need to answer you on this matter. If there is a god
who is able to save us from the blazing furnace, it is our God
whom we serve, and He will save us from your power, 0 king;
but if not, be it known to your majesty that we will neither serve
your god nor worship the golden image that you have set up.4
Chapter 6 relates that Darius, the king, had appointed Daniel chief
of his officers. The officers conspired to bring about the fall of Daniel
and to this end contrived an ingenious trap. They induced Darius to
issue a decree stating that for thirty days no man was to pray to any
man or god except the king, on pain of death in the lion's den. Daniel,
3. 1 Samuel 22:17.
4. Daniel 3:16-18. The book was probably written in the second century B.C.,
though it purports to record events that were supposed to have happened in the sixth
century B.C. The history that is contained in the visions recorded in Daniel goes from
the Babylonian period (sixth century) to the second century B.C. The Book of Daniel,
commentary by Raymond Hammer, CAMBRIDGE BIBLE COMMENTARY 3-6 (1976).
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however, continued praying to God three times daily with the window
of his chambers open toward Jerusalem. His enemies came upon him
while he was praying and reported his disobedience to the King.
After trying to find a way out, the King felt compelled to order Daniel
put into the lion's den.
The stories in the book of Daniel, it should be noted, differ from
the previously described incidents of civil disobedience. The first
two cases involved moral conscience in the face of orders to commit
murder. In the cases reported in the book of Daniel, however, the
acts were not in the realm of moral conscience but in the realm of
religious worship. Although these differences are significant, the con-
cept of nonviolent civil disobedience is broad enough to accommodate
these as well as additional types of conduct. 5
The four books of Maccabees in the Apocrypha offer numerous
instances of civil disobedience during the period of the Hellenization
of Judea, when the second Temple was defiled and dedicated to Zeus
Olympius.6 The Syrian overlords forbade the Jews to offer sacrifices
and to observe the Sabbath and festivals. The Jews were compelled
to make and worship idols, sacrifice swine, and leave their sons un-
circumcised. Disobedience meant death. Among other stories, the
second and fourth books of Maccabees relate the martyrdom of a
mother and her seven sons who refused to eat forbidden food which
was associated with idolatrous sacrifices. They stated unambiguously
their view of non-violent civil obedience as they cried out to the
king's officers, "[W]e are ready to die rather than transgress the laws
of our fathers."7  The seven brothers, who were called Maccabees
by the Church, became models for Christian martyrs, and although
the rabbis rejected the books of the Apocrypha from the canon of
Sacred Scripture, they nevertheless regarded as important the story
of the seven brothers.8
Finally, what may be the first recorded instance of mass non-
violent civil disobedience is found in Josephus' Antiquities of the
5. A further difference in these stories should also be noted. The Egyptian mid-
wives, Saul's guards, and the three Jewish officials refused to commit an act which
they felt was inconceivable. Daniel, however, committed a positive act; he did not
merely refuse to perform an act, he performed an act in violation of a law.
6. See, e.g., 1 Maccabees 1:62-63, 2:20-22; THE NEw OxFoRD ANNOTATED BIBLE
wrrH T- APOcRYPHA (rev. std. ed. 1973).
7. 2 Maccabees 7:2.
8. THE THrnw AND Fotmn-H Booxs OF MACCABEES 129 (Hadas ed. & trans. 1953).
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Jews.9 The event concerned the decision of Caligula to place his
statue in the Temple in Jerusalem. He appointed Petronius as his
agent. Petronius was given a large army but was instructed to try,
in the first instance, to persuade the Jews to permit the installation of
the statue peacefully. If the Jews refused, however, Petronius was
to move with his army and install the statue by force. Petronius
prepared an army of Romans and auxiliaries to carry out this mission
and in due course arrived at Acre, referred to as Ptolemais. What
happened there was graphically reported by Josephus:
But there came ten thousands of the Jews to Petronius at Ptol-
emais to offer their petitions to him that he would not compel
them to violate the law of their forefathers. "But if," they said,
"you are wholly resolved to bring the statue and install it, then
you must first kill us, and then do what you have resolved on.
For while we are alive we cannot permit such things as are for-
bidden by our law and by the determination of our forefathers
that such prohibitions are examples of virtue .... They threw
themselves down on their faces and stretched out their throats
and said that they were ready to be slain.""
Formulation of the Duty of Civil Disobedience
The biblical instances of civil disobedience found in the case of
the Egyptian midwives and that of Saul and his guards involved orders
to commit murder. The cases cited from the books of Maccabees
and from the writings of Josephus involved orders to commit the
sin of idolatry. Persons of conscience may readily agree that they
would prefer martyrdom rather than commit murder or practice
idolatry. What about laws or decrees that call for acts not so heinous
as murder or idolatry even though against the conscience?
In the course of the war that Hadrian waged to destroy Judaism
and the Jewish nation, countless Jews stood ready for martyrdom.
The rabbis, however, saw that indiscriminate martyrdom itself might
be a peril to Jewish survival. With this consideration in mind, they
decreed that the duty to prefer martyrdom was to be restricted to
three transgressions: murder, idolatry, and incest." The rabbis at-
9. F. JOSEPHUS, ANTIQUITIES OF THE JEWS, bk. 18, ch. 3. (Heinemann ed. 1965).
See also F. JOSEPHUS, THE JEWISH WAR, bk. 11, ch. 10, at 184-203 (Penguin ed. 1959).
10. F. JOSEPHUS, ANTIQUITIES OF THE JEWS, bk. 18, ch. 8, at 271 (Heinemann ed.
1965).
11. See note 13 & accompanying text infra.
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tributed this legal principle to Leviticus 18:5: "And ye shall there-
fore guard my statutes and my ordinances, which if a man do, he shall
live in them." They concluded from this passage that the Torah, the
body of Jewish law or teaching, was given to enhance life rather than
to induce death. The emphasis of the Torah is on holy living, not on
holy dying. The rabbis also pointed to the fact that the passage stated
that the statutes and ordinances were such that by observing them a
man shall live-not an Israelite, but a man.' 2  With these two highly
significant interpretations in mind, the rabbis felt that martyrdom had
to be limited to instances involving laws that transgressed the most
basic principles of what came to be called natural law.13 Thus, in the
face of laws or orders that command idolatry, incest, or murder, the
above-stated halakhic (legal) principle calls for the duty of civil dis-
obedience, even at the cost of one's life.
14
What of the incident involving Daniel? According to the story,
Daniel was not required to perform any act. If he had not prayed
at all for thirty days, he would have complied with the King's decree.
Why, then, did he resort to civil disobedience? Was his conduct
consistent with the legal principle later formulated by the rabbis?
It seems that the incident may be interpreted consistently with
the above principle. The Persians believed that their king was a
12. The locus classicus of the legal formulation of the principle concerning martyr-
dom is in the Talmud, the great collection of Jewish law and tradition, produced in
Palestine in the fifth century A.D. or in Babylonia in the sixth century A.D.
"[I]n every other law of the Torah if a man is commanded: 'Transgress and suffer
not death,' he may transgress the commandment and suffer not death - excepting idola-
try, incest [which includes adultery] and murder. . . . Murder may not be practiced
to save one's life .... Even as one who came to Raba and said to him: 'The governor
of my town has ordered me, 'Go and kill so and so; if not, I will slay thee.' Raba
said to him: 'Let him rather slay you than that you should commit murder; who
knows that your blood is redder? Maybe his blood is redder."' THE BABYLONIAN
TALMUDm, Sanhedrin 74a (The Sancino Press ed., H. Freedman trans. 1935).
13. There can hardly be any question about murder and incest falling into this
category. Idolatry was so closely associated with grossly immoral practices that it
could rank with the transgressions of the basic precepts of natural law, and that asso-
ciation was made and stressed by the prophets of the Bible and the rabbis of the Talmud.
Compare the Oedipus Cycle in Greek drama for a similar feeling of revulsion against
an incestuous act.
14. In post-Talmudic Judaism, not all authorities agreed that the law imposed an
absolute duty to choose martyrdom instead of murder in view of the great amount of
duress involved. They also stressed the question of whether the cardinal sin was re-
quired to be committed publicly or secretly. The post-Talmudic discussions are not
considered in this Article. See S. BELKIN, IN His IMAGE 210, 211 (1960). See gen-
erally D. DAuBE, COLLABORATION wrrH T A IN RABBINic LAw.
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god. Accordingly, they set a trap for Daniel, because they suspected
that he would refuse to pray to the king as one prays to God. Had
Daniel failed to offer prayers to anyone for thirty days, his enemies
could have used that fact as evidence of his rejection of the king
as a divinity. From this point of view, the story in its essentials is
not significantly different from the story in the writings of Josephus
of Caligula's desire to have his statue installed in the Temple. By
praying to God while looking out of the window that faced toward
Jerusalem, Daniel acted out his rejection of Persian idolatry. The
story of Daniel is, therefore, not only an instance of civil disobedience
but is also an instance of the later legal formulation of the duty of
civil disobedience to avoid the commission of idolatry, incest, or
murder.
The relation in classical Jewish thought between law and con-
science, as manifested by acts of civil disobedience, is extremely
subtle and complex.15 For the purposes of the present discussion
the exploration of this matter shall be limited to three aspects.
First, conscience, as a specific concept, does not appear in the
Hebrew Scriptures. It is, however, clearly implied. The story of
Cain and Abel would have no point unless conscience were assumed;
there had been no supernatural revelation of a law against murder
before one brother killed the other, nor was there at that time an
enacted criminal code. The same may be said of the judgment on
Sodom and the other cities of the plain, of Noah and the judgment
on his generation, and of the judgments on Egypt and the people of
Canaan.
Much of the Bible, including many passages of the prophets,
assumes that there are laws written on the tablets of the heart, that
there is a law in the heart.16 The words of Jeremiah, "I will put my
law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts,I' were not only
a promise but also a statement of basic belief as to the nature of man.
Without this belief in a law written by God on the tablets of the
heart of every man, God could not be the judge of all the universe
and all peoples and nations. Without this belief, God would be only
the tribal God of Israel, and He could not have been their judge be-
15. Konvitz, Law and Morals in the Hebrew Scriptures, Plato, and Aristotle, 23
CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 44 (Winter 1969).
16. See, e.g., Proverbs 7:3, Deuteronomy 30:14.
17. Jeremiah 31:33.
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fore the revelation of the Ten Commandments at Sinai. Without this
belief, the commandments not to kill, not to commit adultery, or not
to commit theft would have binding force only upon Israel. Indeed,
the argument can be made that the conception of man was of a being
with a moral conscience and with the freedom to act against it. It
is this conscience of which the Bible speaks when it states that the
Egyptian midwives "feared God," and that Amalek, when he acted
cruelly, showed that "he feared not God."18 Similarly, Abraham pre-
tended to be the brother of Sarah because when they came to Gerar
he thought, "Surely the fear of God is not in this place; and they will
slay me for my wife's sake."19
With such interpretations in mind, and with the story of Noah
and the flood before them, the rabbis of the Talmud formulated what
they called "the seven commandments given to the descendents of
Noah." These commandments prohibited idolatry, murder, theft, in-
cest, blasphemy, and the eating of flesh taken from living animals, and
required the establishment of courts of justice. The commandments
were given on the tablets of the heart and to every man everywhere,
because Noah was a kind of second Adam. They spelled out, there-
fore, a natural law which was binding on the conscience of every man
and from which no man, nation, or generation could claim exemption.
Second, this principle of a natural law which was the basis of the
seven commandments given to the descendants of Noah, 20 was ob-
viously the source from which Jewish tradition selected the three-part
principle of civil disobedience: a person must choose to die, if neces-
18. Deuteronomy 25:18.
19. Genesis 20:11.
In Biblical contemplation, there may be said to be a special category of sin which
is an act committed "against the Lord," that is, a sin which implies the denial of the
existence of God. This concept of sin applies to a wrong done to another person secret-
ly under circumstances where there are no witnesses except God. In Leviticus this
type of sin is referred to as follows: "If any one sin, and commit a trespass against
the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or
of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor; or have found that which was lost, and
deal falsely therein, and swear to a lie, in any of all these that a man doeth, sinning
therein .... ." Leviticus 6:2-3. Rabbi Akiba attached great significance to the phrase
"against the Lord," for he believed it meant that the guilty man denies that God was
a witness to the act, and thus by implication he denies God's existence or presence.
This interpretation seems to give the phrase in Leviticus the same meaning as the
phrase, "feared God," and implies conscience.
20. THE BABYLONIAN TALmuD, Sanhedrin 56a (The Sancino Press ed., H. Freedman
trans 1935). See generally Romans 214-15; Acts 15:20, 29.
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sary, rather than obey a law or decree by committing murder, incest,
or idolatry. One significant aspect of this principle, however, is that
the duty of civil disobedience is not extended to all of the seven com-
mandments but only to these three. Thus, if a person is ordered to
commit a theft on the pain of death, that person should commit the
theft.21
Suppose that the sanction for a refusal to commit theft, however,
is imprisonment, not death. May a person in that case resort to civil
disobedience rather than commit the wrong? The principle is silent
as to such cases. The principle only states explicitly that one must
choose to suffer death rather than commit wrong when the wrong to
be committed is idolatry, incest, or murder. The principle only im-
plies that, except for idolatry, incest, or murder, when the penalty to
be suffered is death, one must commit the wrong ordered and avoid
death. A great deal, therefore, is left open when the wrongs com-
manded are other than the three cardinal ones or when the penalty
threatened for disobedience is something other than death.
Finally, the distinctly Jewish halakhic approach to the problem
of conscience versus law, which is an expression of the genius of
classical normative Judaism, should be noted. The legal order pro-
vides a higher law by which a man is commanded to disobey certain
orders, even when they are made by the king or other high officers
of the state. Halakhic Judaism thus speaks not of a right but of a
duty, a legal duty, of civil disobedience. While halakhic Judaism
recognizes conscience, "the fear of God," or the laws written on the
tablets of the heart, it converts morality into law by commanding that,
given proper circumstances, the higher law becomes the living law,
a living law that contradicts and even nullifies the enacted law.
The dialectic of the conceptual relationship between the demands
of conscience, the inner or natural law, and the demands of enacted
law or orders of the state is probably impossible to express with any
precision. The ancient Jewish authorities were wise not to make the
attempt; they instead resorted to existential terms. Thus, as is often
the case in Hebraic-rabbinic thought, an example symbolized a prin-
ciple, and the commentary became the text, as if there were a fear
of making the word into a thing or of accepting the notion that in the
beginning was the logos, the word.
21. MAIMONIDES, HILCHOT YISODEI HA-TORAH 5:4; cf. S. BELKIN, IN His IMAGE,
102-32 (1960).
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The ultimate sanctity is life and not what is said about it in some
abstract formula. Yet life, sacred as it is, is given and sustained for
certain ends. If these ends are threatened, life becomes worthless
and must be given up. The ends are such only because they enhance
life. It is holy living and not holy dying that is cherished. God does
not demand great sacrifice when the occasion is not one of transcend-
ent importance; God makes His demands only when man is called
upon to commit murder, immorality, or idolatry. Only then does the
law of God demand violation of the law of man at the cost of one's
life. Civil disobedience is not offered as an everyday method for
meeting unwelcome situations. Society and individuals must find the
answer to these by other methods and agencies.
Beyond this principle, however, Jewish tradition, as has been
seen, places the highest value on martyrdom when it is the price to
be paid for defiance of a tyrant whose policy is to destroy the Jewish
religion. In the solemn service of Yom Kippur, a prominent place
is given to a recital of the martyrdom of ten great scholars who, during
the Hadrianic persecutions, steadfastly refused to accept the ban on
the study of the Torah and suffered death in order to sanctify the
Name of their God. Within the Jewish tradition of nonviolent civil
disobedience, these ten martyrs have played a role that is at least
comparable to that of Socrates for Western society: the role of wit-
nesses to the force of the moral and religious conscience and its im-
perious claims to obedience.
Jewish law adapted moral claims and converted them into legal
duties, so that civil disobedience itself became lawful. The resolution
of the difficult conceptual problems became possible perhaps through
emphasis on the concept of duty. It was not a question of what a
person may or may not subjectively wish to do. It was not a question
of a clash between the commands of the state and the rights of the
person. It was not a question of the right of civil disobedience. It
was always a matter of facing and performing one's duty: the duty
not to kill, the duty not to commit an immoral act, the duty to avoid
any form of idolatry. It was -not a question of what one's conscience
dictated but what the higher law, the law that is superior to the law
of the state, demanded. An act could, therefore, appear to be an
act of civil disobedience while in reality it was an act of obedience:
disobedience of a lower law, which was in fact no law at all when
tested against the higher law.
July 1978] CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The halakhic view of conscience leaves nothing outside the law.
It does not open the door to the claims of the individual's subjective
conscience. On the other hand, this view incorporates into the law
the weightiest claims of the conscience, which becomes implicated
when demands are made to commit murder, grossly immoral acts, or
acts that the religious conscience would consider idolatrous. Reso-
lution of the possibility of confrontation between law and conscience
could be effectuated only in a social order in which, theoretically, there
was no distinction between law and religion, between religion and
conscience, or between conscience and law. In such an order, the
law could be the source for answers to all questions.
This all-inclusive legal order comprehended within itself certain
laws that could be peculiarly denominated laws of conscience or
natural laws, the laws that God had revealed to the sons of Noah and
that were applicable to all people. These laws were not outside the
legal order. They confronted the human being, but they did not
confront, as outside challengers, the legal order.
Although Biblical Hebrew had no word for conscience, 22 this fact
does not mean that what we call conscience played no role in the
Hebrew Scriptures or in post-biblical Jewish thought. Jewish thought
assumed that the heart could tell a person that he is guilty or innocent,
and as Professor Werblowsky has noted:
The Talmudic language of the rabbis, who were quite familiar
with pangs of conscience and scruples, still speaks only of the
"beating" or "palpitating" heart, and even Bahya ibn Pakuda
(Spain, eleventh century), one of the most outstanding repre-
sentatives of the ascetic spirituality that blossomed under the in-
fluence of Neoplatonism and Sufism, calls his beautiful and wide-
ly read work "The Book of the Duties of the Heart. '"23
If one is going to speak of the "duties of the heart," it must become
obvious that every person has a heart. Whether or not a person has
stood at the foot of Sinai, he is bound by the duties imposed on the
"sons of Noah." There is a preexistent law that provides a content
for the heart. Each man has a heart, but each man is not a law
unto himself. The heart or conscience is not a voice that speaks out
of man; it is a hearing agency given to man so that he may hear the
voice of God.
22. Werblowsky, The Concept of Conscience in Jewish Perspective, in CONSCIENCE
81 (Curatorium of C.G. Jung Institute, Zurich ed. 1970).
23. Id. at 90.
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Today, when extreme forms of individualism often play a domi-
nant role in religious or moral thought, conscience is often thought
to have a legislative function. It makes the law for the individual
which cannot be violated if one is to be true to oneself. Being true
to oneself seems to be the fundamental precept of the moral order.
This legislative function is indeed remote from the traditional
Jewish position. The heart or conscience has a reporting but not an
originating function. It does not make law but only tells a man
whether or not he has violated the law which transcends his person
and which makes demands on him. The law calls to the person; the
call is heard in and by the heart, but it is not the voice of man that
is heard but the voice of God or of the Law. Man is true to himself
only by being true to the Law.
Legislative Conscience: Saint Paul, the Greeks,
and the Romans
In the Hellenistic writings, the Greek term syneidesis or the Latin
conscientia was used for what is today characterized as conscience.
One or the other term was used by many philosophers including Philo,
Plutarch, and Seneca.2 4  "It is very clear," it has been noted,
that conscience only came into its own in the Greek world after
the collapse of the city-state. The close integration of politics
with ethics, with the former predominant, was no longer possible:
there was no sufficiently close authority, external to the individ-
ual, effectively to direct conduct. Consequently, as a pis aller,
men fell back on the internal chastisement of conscience as the
only authority. 25
For the Jew, however, the Torah remained the only authority. Even
if he substituted "conscience" or "heart," he still meant that the con-
tent of his morality was the God-given law.
Against this background it becomes easier than would otherwise
be the case to understand Paul's use of "conscience" in his letter to
the church that he had founded in Corinth and whose members, to-
24. C. PIERCE, CONSCIENCE IN THE NEW TESTA2,1ENT 41, 46, 47 (1955) [herein-
after cited as PIERCE]. See also Rudin, A Catholic View of Conscience, in CONSCIENCE
142, 146 (Curatorium of C. G. Jung Institute, Zurich ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Rudin].
25. PnmcE, supra note 24, at 76.
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gether with their founder and guide, had been Jews. There was
strife among them. How should they resolve their differences? To
what authority could they look for answers to the questions that per-
plexed them? For example, they had among them a member who
was living with his stepmother. Was such conduct lawful for a mem-
ber of the Christian church, and if not, how should his fellow Christians
treat him? 26 The Jewish law explicitly prohibited a man from living
with his father's wife.27 "Let him who has done this be removed
from among you,"2 Paul wrote. "Drive out the wicked person from
among you." 29  Paul followed this halakhic decision, which he handed
down with the authority of a rabbi, with a general instruction to
"[s]hun immorality. ' ' 3°
Paul's moral instruction to the Corinthians was not essentially
different from the rabbinic teaching in the Seven Laws given to the
sons of Noah, which was a body of universal natural law. In essence,
what Paul said to his congregation was that all things had not become
lawful for them, that Christians, Jews, and pagans were bound by
the laws revealed to the sons of Noah, who had become, after the
Flood, the progenitors of the human race. Ultimate serious questions
of morality were not left to be answered by each man according to
his own conscience, his own heart, or his own subjective will. Liber-
ty, said Paul, was not license, because license means enslavement to
one's wilfulness, to the lusts of the body. Thus Paul, when he with-
drew from Judaism, took with him into the Christian church the rab-
binic conception of a natural law, a natural morality, and the con-
ception of a Higher Law, which imposed restraints and limits on
governments and men.
Nevertheless, it was not only from the teachings of Judaism that
Paul could have derived the concept of conscience. The idea had
entered the Hellenistic world after the collapse of the city-state, which
happened centuries before the rise of Christianity. By the time of
Paul the idea had become commonplace .3 1 To cite only two ex-
amples: 1. Plutarch, who was Paul's contemporary, said that con-
science was "like an ulcer in the flesh. It implants in the soul a re-
26. 1 Corinthians 5.
27. Leviticus 18:8.
28. 1 Corinthians 5:2.
29. 1 Corinthians 5:13.
30. 1 Corinthians 6:9-12, 18.
31. PiERcE, supra note 24, at 16, 57, 59.
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morse which never ceases to wound and goad it. Any other pain can
be reasoned away, but this remorse is inflicted by reason, on the soul
which is so racked with shame, and self-chastised;" 32  2. Seneca,
another of Paul's contemporaries, wrote that it is foolish to pray for
a sound understanding:
There is no need to raise our hands to heaven; there is no need
to implore the temple warden to allow us close to the ear of
some graven image, as though this increased the chances of our be-
ing heard. God is near you, is with you, is inside you. Yes, Lu-
cilius, there resides within us a divine spirit, which guards us
and watches us in the evil and the good we do .... In each
and every good man "[a] god (what god we are uncertain)
dwells." 33
In Paul's letter to the Roman church, he neatly fused the lines
of thought from Jewish tradition and Greek ideas. Jews, he wrote,
wil be acceptable to God as they are judged on their merits. The
test for them will be, not knowledge of the Law but the extent to
which they obeyed its precepts. Gentiles, too, who do not have the
Law, will be judged on their merits. For each of them has a con-
science, a heart; they know the difference between good and evil.
Being outside the Law does not mean that they are left without a
moral guide.34
Suppose, however, the conscience misleads. Suppose that the
conscience or heart finds nothing wrong with a man living with his
stepmother. Apparently Paul could not conceive of such a case, be-
cause he assumed that there was a body of moral precepts that was
known to the hearts of both Jews and Gentiles and when one of the
precepts or moral laws was violated, the heart or conscience con-
demned the act.
32. Id. at 47.
33. SENECA, LErrass FROM A STOIC, letter 41, p. 86 (Penguin ed. 1969). The
quotation within the passage is from VMGIL, AENEID, VIII:352. See Rudin, supra note
24, at 142.
34. "Therefore, you have no excuse, 0 man, whoever you are .... For He will
render to every man according to his works .... There will be tribulation and distress
for every human being who does evil, the Jew first and also the Greek, but glory and
honor and peace for everyone who does good, the Jew first and also the Greek . . . for
God shows no partiality....
When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they
are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what
the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness
. .Romans 2:1-15.
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What evil acts or habits did Paul condemn? After a special
condemnation of men and women who engaged in "unnatural" sexual
relations, 35 Paul condemned those who do things for which they
deserve to de:
They were filled with all manner of wickedness, evil, covetous-
ness, malice. Full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, malignity, they
are gossips. Slanderers, haters of God, insolent, haughty, boast-
ful, inventors of evil, disobedient to parents, foolish, faithless,
heartless, ruthless.36
No one, Jew or pagan, could be heard to say that his heart approved
such acts or that his conscience did not condemn such acts as evil.
There was an order of binding values which no one was free to violate
on the claim that he heard a different drumbeat, because he must lie
or be in grave error if, pursuing evil, he claimed that his conscience
was clear.37
Scholars seem to agree that the pagan use of syneidesis or con-
scientia was consistently negative or judicial; that is, the conscience
passed judgment on an act that had already been committed. An
evil deed evoked a bad or guilty conscience. 3 There is a difference
of opinion, however, whether Paul's usage of the term was entirely
consistent with the pagan usage.39
According to Father D'Arcy, Paul should be given credit for
certain innovations with respect to conscience. The term occurs
twenty-three times in Paul's epistles, and in fifteen of these it has
the meaning that the term had for pagan writers, retrospective in
its direction and judicial in its function. In eight instances, however,
two new features may be found; namely, that the conscience may be
subject to error, and that the conscience purports to legislate, to direct
prospective action. 40
Father D'Arcy, however, may have made an excessive claim for
Paul. Pagan philosophers also often spoke as if they believed that
the conscience can order a man not to undertake a course of action.
35. Romans 1:18-21, 29-31.
36. Romans 1:29-31.
37. PIERCE, supra note 24, at 88, points out the sources of error in conscience
noted by Paul.
38. E. D'ARcy, CONSCIENCE AND ITS RIGHT TO FREEDOM 508 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as D'AncyJ.
39. PIERCE, supra note 24, at 114.
40. D'Acy, supra note 38, at 8-12.
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Plato's Apology readily comes to mind in this connection. If he were
to be acquitted, Socrates said, on condition that in the future he would
lead a different kind of life than the kind which had gotten him into
his desperate situation, his response would be as follows:
Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god
rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall
never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out
the truth to any one of you whom I may meet.... For know
that the god commands me to do this . . . Therefore I say
to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not,
and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change
my conduct even if I am to die many times over."'
Socrates related the incident when the Thirty tried to involve him
in a criminal action that would have led to the execution of Leon of
Salamis:
Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only,
that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an
expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do any-
thing unjust or unholy. For that government [of the Thirty],
with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything un-just ... 4 ,12
Conscience, in these instances, worked prospectively and legislatively
to prevent Socrates from entering upon an evil course of conduct.
Clearly, in these cases, conscience did not act to condemn, to pass
judgment upon an evil act already done or commenced. 43
Whether Socrates or Plato or the Stoics used a word, Greek or
Latin, meaning conscience is not important in the history of the idea.
41. PLATO, THE APOLOGY 290-300 (H.N. Fowler trans. 1914).
42. Id. at 32D.
43. Of note is the fact that Socrates spoke of the voice within him as having a
negative effect by commanding him not to do a certain act: "Something divine and
spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I
have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when
it comes it always hold3 me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges
me forward." Id. at 31C-D. Indeed, Socrates referred to this voice within him as
having a future thrust, rather than something that condemned only past actions: "For
hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and op-
posed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not . ..
but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning,
or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech, when I was going to
say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst
of a speech .... ." Id. at 40B-C. See also EpicraTus, AmAN's DIScoURSES, I, ch.
1, 21-25; IV, ch. 7, 17-20 (Heinemann ed. 1925) for additional examples of the pro-
spective function of conscience.
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An unprejudiced reading of the relevant texts shows that to these
philosophers the conscience spoke legislatively and prospectively, and
it was precisely because it performed this function that conscience
was of such transcendent importance. The retrospective, judicial use
of the conscience cannot compare in importance, precisely because
this function of the conscience is identified with the past, with what
has been done and cannot be undone. It is the difference between
planning the future and brooding over the past.44
Within classical Judaism the Law was seen as being all-embrac-
ing, covering all contingencies, and incorporating the basic and indis-
pensable principles of natural law or morality. No room was left for
the role of the individual's subjective conscience. As seen in norma-
tive Judaism, King Saul's guardsmen, the martyrs of the books of
Maccabees, the Jews who confronted Petronius, Daniel, and even the
Hebrew midwives did not need to plead conscience; they could have
pointed to the Noahide or halakhic laws as the basis for their actions".4
Whatever the question, whatever the problem, the answer could be
found in the objective law.46 This objective law does not mean that
conscience was unknown to Judaism. The genius of Judaism was
to translate the dictates or work of conscience into legal principles,
and in theory nothing important was left beyond the pale of the law.
All that was conceivably important in conscience had been assimi-
lated into the law just as English equity law assimilated moral prin-
ciples.
Christianity, however, with its strong antinomian bias, took a
different course. The early church, as the Epistles of St. Paul show,
44. Paul Tillich gives a different interpretation, according to which the demand-
ing, prospective conscience, the warning conscience, is only the anticipation of the
judging or condemning conscience. He says, "The fact that self and conscience arc
dependent on the experience of personal guilt explains the prevalance of the 'bad con-
science' in reality, literature, and theory. It gives evidence of the assertion that the
uneasy, accusing, and judging conscience is the original phenomenon; that the good
conscience is only the absence of the bad conscience; and that the demanding and
warning conscience is only the anticipation of it. Since ego-self and conscience gro\
in mutual dependence and since the self discovers itself in the experience of a split
between what it is and what it ought to be, the basic character of the conscience -
the consciousness of guilt - is obvious." P. TILLIcH, THE PROTESTANT ERA, 136-37
(J. Adams trans. 1951). This view is based on the theory that self-consciousness
arises out of a sense of guilt, which is conscience. Without this sense of guilt or con-
science, there would be no awareness of the "inner man," of selfhood.
45. The anachronism in this statement of the case is, of course, recognized. The
matter is presented not historically but theoretically.
46. See A. STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALmuruD 95-100 (1976).
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had to face the challenges that came from Jewish converts who still
had ties to halakhic principles and practices and from pagan converts
whose lives and actions tended to reflect Roman or other customs or
systems of secular law. There was nothing on which the Christian
could fall back in times of crisis except the imperative claims of the
conscience.
One's conscience is fallible, of course. It may not condemn when
it should, or it may misdirect. Scholastic philosophers were aware of
these problems.47  Many medieval moralists took a position against
the claims of conscience by arguing, on the strength of a point made
by St. Augustine, that a subordinate authority is not binding if it runs
counter to the command of a superior authority, "as for instance, if
the proconsul were to enjoin what the Emperor forbade."4 8  The
question then arises as to the correct course of action if the proconsul
appears to speak in the name of the Emperor, if the subordinate au-
thority (the conscience) claims to speak at the command of the superi-
or authority (God)? St. Albert the Great, in the thirteenth century,
took the position that conscience, or the subjective factor, must be
controlling and must be recognized as having sovereign authority.49
The position taken by Albert became the position of Thomas
Aquinas and appears to be that of Catholic theologians generally. It
has been summarized as follows:
If conscience, rightly or wrongly, declares an action to be com-
manded by God, and a man decides to do the opposite, he can-
not avoid sin. The reason he [Thomas] gives is simple, and it
seems to be decisive: "As far as lies within him, a man [who
has heard the voice of conscience but chooses to disobey it] is
determined not to obey the will of God."5'
The conscience may be in error, or the error could be removed and
the judgment of conscience reversed, but as long as the judgment of
conscience stands, a person is bound not to act against it,51 Any other
answer would mean that a person may consciously choose to disobey
what he believes to be the judgment of God. To one who identifies
the voice of conscience with the voice of God, there can be no alter-
native; he is bound not to act against his conscience.
47. See generally D'Aacy, supra note 38.
48. Id. at 77.
49. Id. at 85.
50. Id. at 100-01.
51. Id. at 113.
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Thomas contended that to despise the command of conscience,
if one believes that conscience is the voice of God, is to despise the
command of God. Modem Catholic teaching takes the argument to
the positive conclusion that it is the same thing to obey the command
of conscience as to obey the command of God.52
Because at times the conscience may fall into error, the Church
found it necessary to intervene, to assert its authority, and to make
its priests advisers and guides. Thus, it began to instruct priests in
casuistry, the science of dealing with cases of conscience.
It may be, as Tillich contends, that for Thomas Aquinas and the
Catholic Church generally, as well as for Luther, the authority of the
conscience was limited to the ethical sphere and that they did not
recognize the possibility of a religious conscience. Heresy, therefore,
could not be avowed with a good conscience. Heresy had to be seen
as simply a demonic possession and condemned as being, perhaps
literally, the work of the devil. 53  This view, however, may be an
overrefinement that falsifies the subjective facts. Surely the early
Christian martyrs, like the Maccabees before them and the Jews who
offered their lives in defense of the Temple against the threats of
Caligula, would not have recognized this limitation on conscience or
the sharp separation of religion from morals. Furthermore, it is
doubtful if traditional Catholics or even Puritan Calvinists could have
made this distinction.
In any case, after Calvin there was a proliferation of religious
sects and religious enthusiasts claiming conscience as the source of
their religious insights. The recognition of religious pluralism and
the wisdom of religious toleration as the state's policy flowed from this
development. Religious conscience, therefore, came of age with the
Reformation's sectarian movements.
When considering Calvin in this context, it is important to note
the great difference between the tone and direction of the Institutes
of a Christian Religion, written in their final version in 1559, and his
subsequent biblical commentaries, especially the Commentaries on the
Book of the Prophet Daniel, written in 1561.54  As long as Calvin had
52. Id. at 125
53. P. TILLIcH, THE PROTESTANT ERA, 139-40 (J. Adams trans. 1951).
54. As the late George H. Sabine noted: "In its initial form Calvinism not only
included a condemnation of resistance but it lacked all leaning toward liberalism, con-
stitutionalism, or representative principles. Where it had free range it developed
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power in Geneva and could hope that his form of Protestantism would
become the religion of the French kings, he, like Luther, stressed the
divine right of the secular power and the duty of passive obedience.
It is, he wrote, "impossible to resist the magistrate without, at the same
time, resisting God himself."55 While private persons had no right to
resist tyranny, Calvin conceded the possibility and propriety of infer-
ior officers deriving from God the right of resistance. He referred to
the ephori, who were a check upon the kings of the Lacedaemonians,
to the plebian tribunes of Rome, and to the demarchi, who were a
check upon the Athenian senate. Such officers, Calvin wrote, betray
the liberties of their people if they fail to oppose the violence or cru-
elty of kings: "such forbearance involves the most nefarious per-
fidy."5 6 In the Institutes, however, Calvin recognized one exception
to the duty of obedience to government: if the rulers command any-
thing that is against God, "it ought not to have the least attention; nor,
in this case, ought we to pay any regard to all that dignity attached to
magistrates." At this point Calvin cited the case of Daniel. 57  In
matters pertaining to religion, "[W]e ought to obey God rather than
men [and] suffer any thing rather than deviate from piety."58
When it became apparent to Calvin that his followers were not
going to have an easy time in France, the Netherlands, and elsewhere,
he concentrated on this right or duty of resistance when the temporal
jurisdiction threatened the spiritual realm. In his Commentaries on
the Book of the Prophet Daniel, written several years after the final
edition of the Institutes, he argued that fear of God must come ahead
of honor of kings. If it were the reverse, there would be a perversion
characteristically into a theocracy, a kind of oligarchy maintained by an alliance of
the clergy and the gentry from which the mass of the people were excluded and which
was, in general, illiberal, oppressive, and reactionary. . . . In pratcice, wherever pos-
sible, Calvinist government [as in Geneva and Massachusetts] placed the two swords
of Christian tradition in the church, and gave the direction of secular authority to the
clergy rather than to secular rulers. The result was likely to be an intolerable rule of
the saints: a meticulous regulation of the most private concerns founded upon uni-
versal espionage, with only a shadowy distinction between the maintenance of public
order, the control of private morals, and the preservation of pure doctrine and worship."
G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 363 (3d ed. 1961).
55. 2 J. CALVIN, INsTrruTEs OF THE CmusTiAN RELIGION, bk. IV, ch. 20, sec.
xxiii, (J. Allen trans. 1936).
56. Id. at see. xxxii.
57. Id. at sec. xxxiii.
58. Acts 5:29.
July 19781 CIVL DISOBEDIENCE
of the order of nature, because kings obtain their authority only from
the fear of God.59
One does not need Christianity, the Reformation, or the Protes-
tant conscience to understand or interpret the case of Daniel. In its
essentials it is not different from the case of the Maccabees and other
cases of civil disobedience reported in the apocryphal books or by Jo-
sephus. When Peter said, "We must obey God rather than men,"60
he spoke as a Jew to other Jews, to whom he did not need to explain
what he meant by this proposition. We should remember, too, that
it was Socrates who said to the Athenian jury that tried him: "Men
of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than
you."61 If Luke was the author of The Acts of the Apostles, it is pos-
sible that he was familiar with Plato's Apology.62 The author of the
book Daniel, the authors of the apocryphal books, Josephus, Peter and
the other apostles, and the authors of the New Testament all lived and
participated in Hellenistic Jewry;63 all were, more or less, at home in
both Jewish thought and Greek culture.6 4  Whether or not they knew
the word for it, all were familiar with what came to be known as con-
science. Calvin, therefore, broke no new ground in his Commentaries
on the Book of the Prophet Daniel. His stand on civil disobedience
had behind it a well-established Jewish-Christian-Hellenic-Hellenistic
tradition that insisted on the primacy of the law of God over the pre-
tended law of an earthly ruler and on the duty of the subject to dis-
regard the impious order of the king.
The Protestant Reformation, however, delivered much more than
was expressly promised by Calvin and the other Reformation leaders.
59. "For if anyone begins his reverence of an earthly prince by rejecting that of
God, he will act preposterously, since this is a complete perversion of the order of
nature. Then let God be feared in the first place, and earthly princes will obtain their
authority . . .Daniel, therefore . . . defends himself with justice, since he had not
committed any crime against the king; for he was compelled to obey the command of
God, and he neglected what the king had ordered in opposition to it. For earthly
princes lay aside all their power when they rise up against God, and are unworthy of
being reckoned in the number of mankind. We ought rather utterly to defy them
than to obey them whenever they are so restive and wish to spoil God of his rights.
and, as it were, to seize upon his throne and draw him down from heaven." J. CALvIN,
COMIMENTARIES ON THE BooK OF THE PROPHET DANIEL, I, 378, 381-84 (T. Myers
trans. 1852-1853).
60. Acts 5:29.
61. PLATO, THE APOLOGY 29d (H.W. Fowler trans. 1914).
62. PEAKE'S COMMENTARY ON THE BIBLE 892 (M. Black & H. Rowley eds. 1962).
63. All were Jews except Luke, who was a Gentile, possibly converted by Paul.
64. See Tcherikover, The Cultural Background, 6 THE WORLD HISTORY OF THE
JEWISH PEOPLE 33 (1972).
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Once the Church and its priests were eliminated as mediators of the
individual's conscience, causistry was discountenanced, the Bible be-
came subject to an open-ended variety of interpretations, and a church
was seen as a voluntary congregation or association of men. The indi-
vidual conscience received a divine or religious sanction. Given the
mixture of ingredients, no other result was possible. The roots of con-
science, as has been seen, are deeply planted in the Hebrew Scriptures
and Jewish history, in Christian martyrology, in the life and death of
Socrates, and in Hellenistic culture. Its flowering, however, came
only with the Protestant Reformation, which, almost unknowingly,
took into itself this rich heritage, together with some elements from
the Renaissance, and it gave forth to the world what may be acknow-
leged as the Protestant conscience.
Whether individualism could have developed without the idea
of the individual conscience or whether the individual conscience
could have developed without the idea of individualism is a matter
of speculation. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for the pri-
ority of the individual conscience and for the proposition that the roots
of the idea of individualism are to be found in religious thought. 5 In
any case, the ideas are intertwined and perhaps inseparable. In the
modem period of history, the religious conscience seems to have
asserted itself before the moral conscience gained recognition.
65. See Y. ARmLi, INrnDmUALisM Arm NATIONALISM IN AmmIucAN IDEOLOGY 242-
72 (1964).
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